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DIGNITY TAKINGS AND DEHUMANIZATION: A SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
LASANA T. HARRIS *
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal systems blend social cognition—inferences about the minds of
others—with the social context. 1 This is accomplished primarily through
defining group boundaries. Specifically, legal systems dictate which people
are governed within their jurisdiction. These people can all be considered
part of the ingroup that the legal system represents. In fact, legal systems
were created to facilitate people living together in large groups. 2 This social
contract requires people to be subject to the laws of their respective local,
state, national, and international groups. Therefore, despite Rousseau’s
theorizing of legal systems being created for all humanity, people governed
by legal systems are assumed to belong to the relevant ingroup, however
such a group is defined.
Because human beings are capable of great good and evil—they
commit human atrocities and (arguably) display altruistic behavior—it begs
the question; what psychological mechanism could facilitate great help and
harm? Here flexible social cognition provides insight. Since people are
motivated by the contents of their minds, which drive their behavior, social
cognition is central to legal decisions. Psychological research demonstrates
that social cognition engagement is flexible, that is, it is possible to both
extend social cognition towards non-human agents, 3 and withhold social
cognition from other people. 4 The phenomenon of withholding social cog* Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London.
1. See generally LASANA HARRIS, INVISIBLE MIND: FLEXIBLE SOCIAL COGNITION AND
DEHUMANIZATION (2017).
2. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (G.D.H. Cole trans., Dover Publ’ns
2003) (1762).
3. See HARRIS, supra note 1.
4. See e.g., Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847 (2006) [Harris & Fiske, Dehumanizing the
Lowest of the Low]; Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, Social Groups that Elicit Disgust Are Differentially
Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 45 (2007) [hereinafter Harris &
Fiske, Social Groups]; Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, The Brooms in Fantasia: Neural Correlates of
Anthropomorphizing Objects, 26 SOC. COGNITION 210 (2008) [hereinafter Harris & Fiske, Brooms in
Fantasia]; Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, Social Neuroscience Evidence for Dehumanised Perception,
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nition is termed dehumanized perception: the failure to engage social cognitive processing in the presence of another human being. 5
Legal theory incorporates dehumanization in thinking about mass
atrocities against humanity, including as a tool to incite collective violence
and genocide, as well as during dignity takings incurred when people suffer
property seizure by the state or governmental authority. Focusing just on
the latter concept of dignity takings, there are a couple of distinctions that
immediately need to be made regarding the use of the concept in the legal
context, and its view in the psychological literature. Firstly, legal scholars
pair infantilization with dehumanization, treating them as separable constructs, while the psychological literature views infantilization as a component of dehumanization. For instance, some psychological theories of social
cognition separate agency (one’s ability to initiate one’s own behavior) and
experience (one’s phenomenology), and situate infantilization within the
experience dimension. 6
Secondly, and more importantly, legal scholars consider dehumanization almost entirely from the target’s perspective (for instance the person or
group who losses property), whereas the psychological literature has empirically studied dehumanization from the perpetrators perspective. In the
legal case, the perpetrator is the state, governmental authority, or some
other non-human entity (such as a country). Indeed, perhaps a person held
the role of executor of decision, but it is often argued that any person in
that role would be expected to execute the decision because it is in the best
interest of the state or governmental authority, and the decision was taken
not in the person’s best interest, but in the state or governmental authority’s
best interest (and sometimes in the dehumanized victims’ best interest as
well). Therefore, the psychological literature can only comment on the
psychological state (perhaps) of that executor of the decision, not on the
cultural perspective that sanctioned dehumanization of the group or person
by the state or governmental authority, in order to better align state or governmental interests. Therefore, throughout this review paper, I will consider
whether there was a specific, identifiable perpetrator: an actor or actors
whose minds may have engaged a dehumanized perception. If such a perpetrator can be identified, then I argue that the social role (an aspect of the
social context) encouraged a dehumanized perception.
20 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 192 (2009) [hereinafter Social Neuroscience]; Lasana Harris & Susan
Fiske, Dehumanised Perception: A Psychological Means to Facilitate Atrocities, Torture, and Genocide? 219 J. PSYCHOL. 175 (2011) [hereinafter Harris & Fiske, Dehumanised Perception].
5. See sources cited supra note 4.
6. Heather M. Gray et al., Dimensions of Mind Perception, 315 SCI. 619, 619 (2007).
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This approach applies all five tenets of dehumanization espoused by
the psychological research. The first tenet states that everyone is capable of
dehumanization. This is satisfied because anyone in the social role would
have enacted the decision that resulted the dehumanized perception. It suggests everyone is capable of dehumanizing another person if the people in
the role are not exceptional in some way, such as psychopathic, or in possession of a high number of sociopathic traits for instance. This is also easily satisfied in most cases. The second tenet states that the social context
promotes dehumanization. This is satisfied since the social role as a kind of
a social context determines when dehumanization takes place. The third
tenet states that dehumanization does not always lead to negative behavior.
Most behavior that results dignity takings does not stem from a negative or
harmful act, but a logical or reasonable one that maximizes financial benefit, avoids harm of the victims, or makes a product or service more efficient. Therefore, the act itself is not harmful, and the outcomes are often
positive for the state or governmental authority (though negative for the
dehumanized victim). The fourth tenet suggests dehumanization is functional, allowing the completion of a task at hand. This is satisfied for reasons stated in the first and third tenet; dehumanization facilitates the
decision-making process of the person or group of persons that results the
dignity taking. Finally, the fifth tenet—dehumanization avoids empathy
exhaustion—is the most difficult to satisfy without getting information
from the decision-makers private minds. Therefore, this final tenet remains
unsatisfied by my approach, but is nonetheless consistent with the fourth
tenet that dehumanization is functional. Empathy is a negative emotional
experience that results positive outcomes to others, often at a personal cost;
avoiding such an emotional state is functional, particularly if the decision
could result negative outcomes for the dehumanized victims.
II. DEHUMANIZED PERCEPTION AND FLEXIBLE SOCIAL COGNITION
The actual, imagined, or implied presence of another human being
spontaneously triggers dual person perception processes. This duality suggests that people are in fact Cartesian dualists. The first process is feature
space matching—comparing the visual pattern of the person, including
their height, skin color, and other appearance-based features to templates
stored in the visual and temporal cortices of the brain 7—allowing person
7. James V. Haxby et al., Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Face and Object Representations in the Human Brain, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 889–904 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 3d
ed. 2004); Alexander Todorov, The Social Perception of Faces, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
COGNITION 96–114 (Susan T. Fiske & C. Neil Macrae eds., 2012).
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identification, and triggering the second process, social cognition. This
second process, however, does not depend on visual input to engage, allowing the imagined or implied qualifiers regarding the presence of another
person to be necessary. Such social cognitive responses rely on Bayesian
inferences aggregated from statistical information about the behavior of
people 8, as well as bodily responses that provide physiological feedback
about the self. 9 In the brain, parts of neo-cortex, including medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), precuneus, temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) extending
along the superior temporal sulcus (STS) to the anterior temporal pole
(ATP), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) underlie social cognition. This
massive network of brain regions suggests that social cognition requires
substantial processing, despite the fact that the experience of social cognitive engagement is spontaneous and effortless.
I argue that the social context and goals can determine whether social
cognition is extended or withheld. For instance, regarding the other prominent use of dehumanization involving mass atrocities, collective violence,
and crimes against humanity, instances of torture perpetrated by American
and British troops in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are due to the social
context: a threatening environment and a chain of command demanding
results perhaps resulted in these extremely harmful behaviors. 10 Similarly,
genocides and collective violence in Rwanda, Germany, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Darfur were all enabled by social contexts that dehumanized the
victims, painting them as vermin and less human. Most disturbingly, modern human trafficking and New World slavery resulted from social goals
that prioritized profit at the expense of dignity, civility, and human decency. In all of these cases, social cognition could trigger emotional responses
that would conflict with the social goals and the social context, 11 making
dehumanized perception necessary.
However, the cases just described cannot be subject to experimental
scrutiny for obvious ethical reasons. Nonetheless, dehumanization does not
escape empirical study because brain activity provides an index of whether
social cognition has been engaged or not. In one such experiment, partici-

8. See, e.g., Fritz Heider, Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality, 51 PSYCHOL. REV. 358
(1944); Alison Gopnik & Henry Wellman, Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Is a Theory, 7 MIND &
LANGUAGE 145 (1992). Alison Gopnik & Henry Wellman, Reconstructing Constructivism: Causal
Models, Bayesian Learning Mechanisms, and the Theory Theory, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1085 (2012).
9. Manos Tsakiris, The Multisensory Basis of the Self: From Body to Identity to Others, 70 Q. J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 597, 597–609 (2017).
10. Susan Fiske et al., Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners, 306 SCI. 1482, 1482–83
(2004).
11. Harris & Fiske, Social Neuroscience, supra note 4.
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pants were shown stereotypical pictures of different societal groups, such
as homeless people, drug addicts, rich people, elderly people, and college
students while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. 12 Participants were tasked with indicating what emotions the pictures made them
feel. Results reveal that the social cognition brain network was less engaged when viewing the pictures of members of traditionally dehumanized
social groups such as the homeless and drug addicts. Participants also rated
these people as lower on warmth and competence—the two primary trait
dimensions of person perception—and indicated that they elicited disgust.13
Moreover, they used less mental state verbs (such as wish, want, relax)
when describing a day in the life of these people, rated them lower on dimensions that distinguish human beings from animals and objects such as
intelligence and articulateness, and reported more difficulty when attempting to infer their personality and their mental state. 14
Participants playing violent first-person-shooter video games also display the dehumanized perception brain pattern. 15 In this experiment, experienced video-game players competed against their friends in a kill-or-bekilled virtual scenario. These participants displayed the dehumanized perception brain response just before pulling the trigger to blow away their
friends’ avatars.
The dehumanization brain response also occurs in cases of sexism.
Highly benevolent and hostile sexist men endorse ideas suggesting that
women should be cherished, protected, and put on a pedestal, but should
not engage in work outside the home. Such men exhibit the dehumanized
perception brain response when viewing pictures of scantily clad females
compared to fully clad females. 16 Moreover, such men fail to attend to the
faces of scantily clad females, fixating instead on their bodies. 17
Finally, everyday people are also capable of dehumanizing other everyday people. In one such demonstration, we first created a labor market
based on participants’ (players’) ability to estimate time intervals. Another
12. Harris & Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low, supra note 4; Harris & Fiske, Social
Groups, supra note 4; Harris & Fiske, Dehumanised Perception, supra note 4.
13. Susan Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth
Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878,
902 (2002).
14. Harris & Fiske, Dehumanised Perception, supra note 4.
15. Klaus Mathiak & Rene Weber, Toward Brain Correlates of Natural Behavior: fMRI during
Violent Video Games, 27 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 948, 956 (2006).
16. Mina Cikara et al., From Agents to Objects: Sexist Attitudes and Neural Responses to Sexualized Targets, 23 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 540, 540–51 (2011).
17. Philippe Bernard et al., Integrating Sexual Objectification with Object Versus Person Recognition: The Sexualized-Body-Inversion Hypothesis, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 469, 469–71 (2012).
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group of participants (owners) were then endowed with money and bought
five such players to comprise a time estimation team who would compete
on behalf of the owners for the owners’ financial benefit. Owners exhibited
the dehumanized perception brain response when they viewed pictures of
the players they purchased to compete on their behalf. 18
In addition to the brain imaging evidence, behavioral evidence also
supports the everyday occurrence of dehumanization, specifically in the
context of intergroup relations. For instance, research on infrahumanization
theory demonstrates that people attribute to their outgroup less secondary,
complex emotions that require social cognition. 19 People rate outgroups as
less evolved on a scale of human evolution. 20 Americans of predominantly
African descent are implicitly associated with apes, and media references to
ape and jungle analogies and metaphors during capital cases in Philadelphia predict whether a descendant of African, not European descent, will be
sentenced to death. 21
More importantly, the engagement of social cognition enacts moral
and social rules that govern behavior towards other people, and allow us to
impression manage since we can determine whether we have conveyed a
positive impression to another person. 22 Human beings are agents—they
are capable of originating their own behaviors. However they are flexible
and intentional agents since they can change their minds. Moreover, when a
person encounters another person, that second person is also forming an
impression of the first person. Since people care about the impressions
others have of them to maintain a positive reputation, they are constantly
adjusting their behavior based on their social cognitive inferences. Additionally, it is very difficult to verify whether inferences gleaned from social
cognition engagement are accurate since people are capable of deception. 23
The occurrence of social cognition distinguishes person perception
from object perception since people possess minds. 24 For instance, computers, like people, are information processing systems that register and learn,
18. Lasana Harris et al., Assigning Economic Value to People Results in Dehumanization Brain
Response, 7 J. NEUROSCI. PSYCHOL. & ECON. 151, 159–63 (2014).
19. Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., Psychological Essentialism and the Differential Attribution of
Uniquely Human Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 395, 411 (2001).
20. Nour Kteily et al., The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for Blatant Dehumanization, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 901, 901–31 (2015).
21. See, e.g., Phillip A. Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292 (2008).
22. See generally SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO
CULTURE (2d ed. 2013).
23. See generally HARRIS, supra note 1.
24. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 22.
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and display agency in that they can make decisions based on programmed
algorithms. However, because they do not have minds, we are not concerned with their impressions of us, and we do not apply moral rules when
interacting with them.
III. PUNISHMENT
As discussed above, the concept of dehumanization is central to legal
arguments regarding genocide and crimes against humanity, but recently it
has been incorporated into property law with the concept dignity takings. In
such legal instances, the relevant group perhaps can be considered all humanity. In fact, I argue elsewhere that the concept of human emerged from
the concept of ingroup. 25 In our evolutionary past, human beings lived in
much smaller groups than we do today. As a result, most other humans
encountered were ingroup members. Legal systems therefore can allow
exclusion from the ingroup of humanity, utilizing dehumanization and dignity takings since dehumanization excludes a person from moral and legal
protection reserved for human beings.
Moreover, legal systems are primarily concerned with punishment.
More specifically, legal systems are concerned with punishing people with
bad minds that motivate bad behavior. This allows legal systems to enforce
rules that govern social interactions, and interactions between individuals,
institutions, and non-human entities such as the state or government. One
motive for punishing such people is to influence the future occurrence of
such behavior, both by incapacitating the guilty party, and by deterring
others from engaging in such behavior. As a result, punishers have become
professionalized in modern societies, including prosecutors, judges, police
and prison officer. 26
When considering the brain, research on punishment suggests that it is
driven by a largely affective response. 27 Participants’ punishment severity
tends to correlate with activity in the amygdala; a brain region implicated
in fear conditioning, learning, and general emotional processes. 28 This is
consistent with the functions of punishment. Punishment communicates to
the punished and to everyone else that the social contract is not to be broken. It suggests that the group is not to be tampered with. Indeed, forms of
25. HARRIS, supra note 1.
26. Fiery Cushman, Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions, 10 PHIL. COMPASS
117, 133 (2015).
27. Joshua Buckholtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-party Punishment, 60 NEURON 930,
930–40 (2008).
28. THE HUMAN AMYGDALA (Paul J. Whalen & Elizabeth A. Phelps eds., 2009).
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punishment in human history often entailed public displays, for instance
impaling severed heads on pikes that were then displayed at the castle wall.
Given that emotions are also communicative signals, providing information
about the internal state of the person displaying the emotion, it follows that
an emotional response drives punishment decisions.
Moreover brain systems underlying punishment often extend beyond
the amygdala, 29 incorporating regions of prefrontal cortex (PFC) and orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) involved in higher order cognition such as reasoning and decision-making, as well as the anterior insula, a brain region
involved in disgust responses and interoception. 30 Other subcortical regions
are also involved beyond the amygdala, including the periaqueductal grey
as well as parts of the striatum: brain regions important in learning and
decision-making. 31 This suggests that punishment is more than an affective
response, but requires higher order cognition and decision-making, and
triggers learning mechanisms.
These brain activation patterns are also consistent with other functions
of punishment beyond communicating something about the social contract
and the ingroup. Punishment also enables restoration of the ingroup, building group cohesion. 32 This may occur because punishment also satisfies the
need for vengeance amongst group members. 33 Again, earlier forms of
human punishment allowed each member of the group to enact vengeance:
placing the punished in stocks for public display and torment, groups pelting stones or other projectiles at the punished, and public executions all
allow the group to exact some measure of vengeance. Interestingly, here we
have group behavior perpetrated by specific actors who are not identified or
held accountable, but all of whom presumably have a similar mind-set that
motivates the negative behavior against the punished, painting it as necessary. A similar phenomenon occurs during dignity takings, where the individual that facilitates the dignity taking is not held accountable, and the
larger group (state or governmental authority) is blamed and held accountable.

29. See Ben Seymour et al., The Neurobiology of Punishment, 8 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 300,
303–11 (2007).
30. A.D. Craig, How Do You Feel—Now? The Anterior Insula and Human Awareness, 10
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 59, 60–70 (2009).
31. Daphna Shohamy, Learning and Motivation in the Human Striatum, 21 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROBIOLOGY 408, 408–14 (2011).
32. George Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, 63 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1339,
1339–40 (1961).
33. Kevin Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, in 40
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 226 (2008).
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IV. DEHUMANIZATION AND DIGNITY TAKINGS
The legal concept of dignity takings states that this phenomenon occurs when the state confiscates or destroys property from individuals considered less than human. 34 This concept that originated within property law
has been expanded beyond this domain (see the contents of this law review
issue), and now includes instances where dehumanization facilitates actions
by the state or other governmental authority outside the domain of property, including medical care, education, and music among many others. The
commonality across these different domains is that something has been
taken away by a non-human entity, or group (state, governmental authority,
even culture), from another person or group of persons. Therefore, dehumanization is central to this legal concept (as stated above, I include infantilization as a form of dehumanization, thus I will only discuss the broader
concept).
However, this legal concept that hinges on dehumanization makes a
number of assumptions about dehumanization that rely on lay theories, not
the scientific research described above. As a result, there are important
differences between the psychological concept of dehumanization, and
dehumanization as it is discussed in the legal case of dignity takings. For
instance, lay theories of dehumanization associate it with humiliation and
violence. However, the scientific research suggests that dehumanization is
more of an everyday phenomenon, capable of being committed by anyone
against anyone else. Furthermore, as described above, the scientific view of
dehumanization requires an identifiable perpetrator: a person whom is responsible for failing to infer the mind of another, thus makes a decision or
takes action that results in dignity taking. But the dignity takings concept
does not require an identifiable perpetrator, and leverages the perpetrator as
the state or some other governmental authority. Therefore, no single person
is responsible for dehumanizing the victims, and the dignity takings result
as a consequence of the actions of the state or governmental authority.
How then are these differences best reconciled? Regarding the first
difference, a milder definition of dehumanization as espoused by the scientific work is not inconsistent with the approach to dignity takings described
in the other articles in this review. In fact, extending dignity takings beyond
34. See generally BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH
AFRICA’S LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014); Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171
(2016); Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical
Framework to Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796 (2016).
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property law requires a milder definition of dehumanization, allowing it to
be observed in employment, health-care, education, and even music and
popular culture. Some might even argue that the initial move of dehumanization from human atrocities to property law necessitated a milder definition of dehumanization. The second difference is not as easily reconciled.
In most cases, a specific actor is not identified as responsible for engaging
a dehumanized perception during dignity takings. However, the experience
of the dehumanized victims may allow us to reconcile the legal with the
psychological concept. A state or governmental authority can be anthropomorphized, that is, can be viewed as possessing a mind. If a person experiences dehumanization, labeling the experienced behavior as
‘dehumanizing’ requires an inference based on the behaviors of another,
including perhaps an anthropomorphized other. If the people who have
their dignity taken view the state as an anthropomorphized being, then it is
possible that they can infer that the state dehumanizes them, resulting in a
dignity taking. This attempt at reconciliation hinges on the view of the
victim, the person or group whose dignity has been taken, not the state or
governmental authority perpetrating the offense. As a result, it is perfectly
valid to consider the victims’ point of view, reconciling the legal definition
of dignity taking with the scientific research on dehumanization. Next, I
consider whether the scientific view of dehumanization may find support in
a few of the cases of dignity takings described in this review.
V. WEAKER CASES FOR DIGNITY TAKING WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVIDENCE
A. Criminal Punishment
The more relaxed application of dignity takings beyond the domain of
property law employed in this review allows a number of other legal domains to become relevant. One such domain is criminal punishment. For
instance, psychological research has already demonstrated relationships
between dehumanizing language in the media and death-penalty sentences. 35 Indeed, as Acevedo describes, the Common Law enacted in seventeenth century England not only sentenced the guilty to death (a fate worse
than dignity taking), but also confiscated their property so that their heirs
were also punished. This extreme form of punishment, it is argued, is an
example of dignity taking because the heirs are now dehumanized, deemed
not worthy of inheritance. The early American settlers who fled to the Mas35. See Goff et al., supra note 21.
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sachusetts Bay Colony sought to avoid such harsh punishment, yet instantiated other forms of punishment that destroyed the body, not property. For
instance, cases of ‘scarlet letters’, pillorying, whipping, and other forms of
public punishment harken to medieval forms of punishment, communicating to the community that the punished was less than human.
One can argue whether indeed these forms of punishment carried out
on the body constitute a dignity taking. More specifically, one can ask
whether they meet the two necessary criteria for dignity taking: confiscation of property and dehumanization. The initial burden of proof lies with
whether bodily harm equates to bodily confiscation. Incapacitating someone’s body denies them their ability to perform simple human biological
functions, and could constitute a confiscation. Moreover, the state can take
a person’s body and use it for their own purposes, such as forced labor
while imprisoned. Therefore, the confiscation element of dignity taking
seems to be present. However, proving dehumanization is a bit more difficult when subject to the criteria I have previously identified; an identifiable
perpetrator. In these cases, the bodily harm was often carried out by a professional punisher who themselves did not make the decision to execute the
harm. The decision to harm the body was often made by other professional
punishers who themselves were simply following the advice of legal code,
not their own personal motives. As such, we must rely on the concept of an
anthropomorphized entity to justify that dehumanization has occurred.
When one is hanged or burned at the stake, it is not possible to ascertain the
one’s view of the state whose legal code promotes such behavior. This task
becomes even more difficult since these are historical incidents with incomplete and other biased accounts. Therefore, the jury is still out as to
whether these forms of criminal punishment constitute dehumanization and
subsequent dignity takings.
B. Kurdish Independence.
The difficulty of identifying unequivocally that dignity taking has occurred is suffered by other accounts beyond property law discussed in this
volume. For instance, Albert argues that the Iraqi Kurds suffer dignity takings because of a denial of self-determination in their quest for independence and self-governance. Stated differently, the state of Iraq has taken
their dignity because they have not been allowed self-governance when
they are certainly capable of governing themselves. This view of dignity
taking and the resulting dehumanization is consistent with the scientific
definitions, but again lays the role of perpetrator at the feet of the state, not
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a specific individual. Moreover, this view of dignity taking hinges on denial of property rights, in addition to a denial of self-governance.
Such dignity takings, however, require a person’s mind to justify explanatory arguments for abuses that include dehumanization. Yes, Iraqi
Kurds can report that they have experienced dehumanization and have had
their dignity taken. But the social cognition requirement that these victims
have an identified perpetrator, real or anthropomorphized, is more difficult
to meet. Because the state, not a single mind (or small group of minds), was
behind the denial of self-determination, then an anthropomorphized perpetrator is most likely. Perhaps political leaders represent the single individuals who execute the act, but if it is likely that any other non-Iraqi Kurd
would have performed the behavior when in the role of political leader,
then it is the role itself that is attributed mind, not the specific person involved. Does such an assertion remove the Iraqi Kurds from the realm of
dignity taking? Perhaps not, given the property loss incurred at the hands of
the Iraqi government. Nonetheless, the strong claim of dignity taking is
difficult to justify since the perpetrator again is the state, not a specific
individual.
C. Other Cases
Similarly difficult justifications also occur with the Columbian land
restitution, Polish workers, and African music appropriation in Europe. In
each of these cases, it is extremely difficult to identify a perpetrator because the perpetrator is either the state, or culture. As such, though the victims have all suffered a loss, the application of the psychological definition
suggests dignity taking claims fall slightly short.
VI. STRONGER CASES FOR DIGNITY TAKING WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVIDENCE
A. Tax Delinquency Sales
Perhaps the phenomenon of tax delinquency sales best meets the requirements for strong dignity taking claims. Kahrl describes a particularly
egregious form of dignity taking related to tax delinquency: The sale of tax
liens by governmental authorities to private investors resulting in the exploitation of specific populations, particularly racial minorities and the
elderly, allowing the private investors to seize their property because of
minor financial infractions regarding the paying of property tax. Here, dignity taking surrounds the abuse of tax laws and loopholes by private investors to dispossess those who are more vulnerable to dehumanization
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because of their social class, ethnicity, or age. This case does provide an
identifiable perpetrator who is responsible for dehumanizing a victim: the
private investors. However, as is the case with other dignity takings, the
dehumanization is facilitated by the state: changes in complicated property
tax laws are not properly communicated to the victims, and payments are
even sometimes ignored. Such obvious dignity takings demonstrate collaboration between the state and private investors to execute dehumanizing
behavior, suggesting that even if specific perpetrators are identified, they
are still not culpable since the state facilitates their abuses, making them
legal.
One might argue for a strong case of dignity takings in cases of tax delinquency sales since the perpetrator can be identified. Despite the fact that
a few such individuals could be identified, they do so only in the social role
of private investors. Like all others, this role absconds them of blame given
its legal status, but protests less against the moral responsibility attached to
these people. Now we have a case of dignity taking with all components.
Moreover, the manner of execution of the dignity taking suggests the minds
of the homeowners were not considered, confirming their dehumanized
status. Interestingly, this issue was first identified by formerly enslaved
people of African descent in America, a most egregious case of dehumanization in human history.
B. School Closure
The question remains have we made a turn, and have we identified instances of dignity taking that satisfies legal definition and could be backed
up perhaps by strong biological claims? A similar account applies in school
closures in Chicago, Illinois; another instance where the state, in collaboration with specific individuals, facilitates dignity takings. In this scenario
described by Shaw, the governmental authority closes a neighborhood
school, reassigning children to schools further away. These schools often
required the children walking through violent neighborhoods bordering
their own, rather than staying in their community, despite the parents’ contributions to the development of the now closed school. Here, the identified
perpetrator is the government board or council responsible for making such
decisions. Again, their small numbers make them more identifiable, despite
the fact that again their social role barred them from full legal culpability.
Moreover, this particular case adds another wrinkle; a consideration of
what dignity takings may be like when a small group of people decide to
enact property violations than result in the removal of communities due to
dehumanization. Indeed, many people in the role of board or council repre-
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sentative could make an alternative decision and go against the majority,
but the majority nonetheless could be accused of dehumanization that results dignity taking. Further, the criteria for school closure relied solely on
an algorithm that failed to consider many variables relevant to community
and the residents, along with failings by school board members to show up
at meetings and hearings, confirming the suspicion of dehumanization and
dignity takings.
C. Hospital Closings
And such abuses continue concerning hospital care as well. Again, as
is the case for schools, a community loses one of its most necessary institutions. In the particular case described by Ossei-Owusu in Los Angeles,
California, not only did the local authority remove the hospital, but they
replaced it with an inadequate one, allowing common descriptions of the
hospital to be a place where you go to die, not survive. This particular level
of dignity taking arises perhaps more on the implicit level, where the presence of a hospital, regardless of its ability to execute its intended functions
well, is sufficient to avoid engaging the minds of the community members.
This presents perhaps a case where dehumanized perception promotes rational cost-benefit analysis of information collected from such places, justifying all related decisions by the local authority.
The dignity takings suffered by the ethnic minority members of the
population of Los Angeles is often unheard because it resulted in death. In
this case, dignity taking leads not only to threat to life by walking through a
dangerous neighborhood to attend school everyday, but often death and
disability when such could have been avoided. Despite this fact, decisionmakers can continue to live free of guilt because the psychological processes necessary to trigger empathy and other such social emotions like guilt,
shame, and compassion have not gotten into gear. Death is no longer the
great moral trigger it is in other instances.
D. Bath-Houses
Another interesting case of dignity taking comes from the closure of
bath-houses in New York city by the New York Public Health Authority
described by Engel and Lyle. Such closures removed a safe space for socializing for members of the lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgendered
(LGBT) community since they used such facilities as places where their
hidden stigma could be comfortably and safely revealed. LGBT identity is
often concealed, meaning that the stigma is hidden, but focusing on the
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physical spaces they occupied within the city could still target LGBT individuals despite the concealed identity. Bath-houses were one such physical
space. What makes the closure of these facilities interesting is that the identifiable perpetrators (NYC Public Health) used claims regarding violations
of public health codes as justification for the closures. In other words, the
perpetrators claimed to be protecting the victims, not harming them. A
similar situation occurred when considering the school and hospital closures discussed above; these institutions did not meet a metric for performance and or efficiency, therefore were deemed more harmful that helpful,
warranting their closure.
But why would the perpetrators require a benefit claim as justification
for their harm to the victims? Does this not suggest that they did not dehumanize the victims, but considered their minds and took action intended for
their benefit? In the abstract, this certainly seems the case. However, true
consideration of the victims’ perspective would have led to an alternate
conclusion, and the intended helpful behavior could have been clearly identified as harmful. In fact, many moral violations occur because of potential
imagined benefits for the victims instead of simply considering their actual
perspectives and consistent benefits. After all, many claimed at the time
that the enslavement of Africans occurred in an attempt to rid them of their
demonic religions and introduce civility to these less evolved people.
E. Japan-Town
A type of death can often occur to an entire community, again perpetrated by a governmental authority. When a city council reassigns the designation of a neighborhood for financial benefit, this often forces original
occupants out, and destroys migrant communities. This is a specific case
where economics can impact dehumanization. For instance, there once
existed a Japan-town in Sacramento, California, as described by Joo. This
neighborhood provided food, housing, and community resources for not
only the Japanese migrants, but also those who valued and consumed Japanese products and culture, including such people from beyond the city limits. However, dignity taking was suffered when this neighborhood died
because of the re-designation.
Again, the question remains; was there an identifiable perpetrator? In
this case, blame can be attributed to the city council board members. Perhaps from their point of view, the goal was not to eliminate Japan-town, but
to boost the economic viability of the land on which the neighborhood sat.
Indeed, Japan-town’s location in the heart of the city meant that it sat on
prime real-estate, evidenced by the fact that today that land houses a sport-
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ing complex, with retail shopping and upscale housing. Certainly, any objective person can agree that economically, much more money is made
from the current use of the land than when the land hosted Japan-town.
However, such purely economic views encourage dehumanization because
they fail to consider the minds of the people affected by such decisions,
instead considering only the financial rewards. Such an economic view
probably led to the city council board members dehumanizing the Japanese
migrants, and facilitated the dignity taking.
F. Trailer Trash
Similarly, changing the designation of land for financial benefit also
leads to dignity taking of trailer park homeowners. Such people buy their
low-cost home, often spending many years living in it, making substantial
financial investments in their property. However, they typically rent the
land on which such homes reside either from governmental authorities or
from private investors. Occasionally, these investors or governmental authorities will reassign the use of the land, evicting mobile home owners.
This reassignment is often for financial benefit; the land could become
more valuable serving a different purpose rather than low-income housing.
Despite the term ‘mobile home’, most trailer park homes cannot be moved
because movement would result in extensive damage to the home. As a
result, such homes are often demolished, and as happened in the Japantown example, communities are destroyed, as described by Sullivan.
Unlike many other examples, finding an identifiable perpetrator in this
instance is quite easy: the landowner. However, this person is well within
their rights to do with their land as they please. Nonetheless, I argue that
such a person making this decision has to dehumanize the mobile park
homeowners, ignoring their minds and the financial and community loss
they suffer due to the eviction. The clear identification of a perpetrator in
this instance makes the dignity taking clear, even when the landowner is a
governmental authority.
VII. A FINAL THOUGHT REGARDING IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGNITY
RESTORATION
Scientific research has failed to study the psychological consequences
of being dehumanized. Such research is vital in order to achieve dignity
restoration following behaviors by the state or governmental authority that
results dignity taking. This research suggests that a singular mind is required for the actual occurrence of dehumanized perceptions that facilitate
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dignity takings. However, since the state or governmental authority usually
carries out such actions, then an anthropomorphized agent possesses the
mind responsible. This makes responses to dignity taking to this anthropomorphized being different to general dehumanization suffered. Indeed,
tyrants and dictators, single individuals, not people who simply fill the role
of political leader or governmental authority figurehead, have classically
been described as engaging in dehumanization. Moreover, when decisions
are jointly made, this is a combination of many minds, diffusing the responsibility for the singular decision, making the anthropomorphism further necessary. Therefore, should the concept of dehumanization be left for
the dictators, initiators of collective violence, or should it be applied to
property law and all of these other domains?
Certainly, it does suggest that considering dehumanization from the
perspective of the dehumanized person or group makes relevant the process
of dignity taking, and provides support for dignity restoration attempts,
whatever the consequences. An interesting conclusion from this discussion
surrounds the definition of ‘identifiable’ in the phrase ‘identifiable perpetrator’. I have argued that an identifiable perpetrator is necessary in order to
attribute dignity taking to a particular case because this enables the inference that such a person ignored the minds or dehumanized the victims. In
most of the examples discussed in this review, there is not a single perpetrator, but a small group who is responsible. Is there a particular group size
above which the claim of ‘identifiable’ can no longer be made? Perhaps,
but in the context of this discussion, I have argued that a dignity taking
occurred when the identifiable perpetrators belonged to governmental
committees, councils, and the like where there are a finite number of people involved in the decision-making process. I have argued that no dignity
taking occurred when the identifiable perpetrator was a country, or another
large group where a finite number of people did not make the decision, but
the decision resulted from many other decisions that summed into the act
that resulted the loss of property. It may be the case that this view of identifiable is itself flawed; one could argue that even in smaller groups, the decision-making process is such that many other decisions also sum to the
action that results the dignity taking. However, though this may indeed be
the case, the decision-making process in these smaller groups often does
not result from such summation, but rather from a direct decision that result
in the property loss. As such, these decision-makers can be considered
identifiable. Nonetheless, this issue of identifiable perpetrator is irrelevant
if dignity taking is simply considered from the victims’ perspective. This is
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where psychology has to do better if it is to continue to inform legal practice.

